Recent work has revealed a new class of "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies for iterated, two-player games. ZD strategies allow a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between her score and her opponent's score, and thus achieve an unusual degree of control over both players' long-term payoffs. Although originally conceived in the context of classical, two-player game theory, ZD strategies also have consequences in evolving populations of players. Here we explore the evolutionary prospects for ZD strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD). Several recent studies have focused on the evolution of "extortion strategies" -a subset of zero-determinant strategies -and found them to be unsuccessful in populations. Nevertheless, we identify a different subset of ZD strategies, called "generous ZD strategies," that forgive defecting opponents, but nonetheless dominate in evolving populations. For all but the smallest population sizes, generous ZD strategies are not only robust to being replaced by other strategies, but they also can selectively replace any non-cooperative ZD strategy. Generous strategies can be generalized beyond the space of ZD strategies, and they remain robust to invasion. When evolution occurs on the full set of all IPD strategies, selection disproportionately favors these generous strategies. In some regimes, generous strategies outperform even the most successful of the well-known Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies, including win-stay-lose-shift.
Introduction
Press and Dyson [1] recently revealed a remarkable class of strategies, called "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies, for iterated two-player games. ZD strategies are of particular interest in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), the canonical game used to study the emergence of cooperation among rational individuals [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . By allowing a player to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between her payoff and her opponent's payoff, Press and Dyson argue, ZD strategies provide a sentient player unprecedented control over the longterm outcome of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. In particular, Press and Dyson highlighted a subset of ZD strategies, called "extortion strategies," that grant the extorting player a disproportionately high payoff when employed against a naive opponent who blindly adjusts his strategy to maximize his own payoff.
A natural response to Press and Dyson is to ask: What are the implications of ZD strategies for an evolving population of players [10] ? Although several recent studies have begun to explore this question [11, 12] , they have focused almost exclusively on extortion strategies. Extortion strategies are not successful in evolving populations, unless the population size is very small. Like all strategies that prefer to defect rather than to cooperate, extortion strategies are vulnerable to strategies that reward cooperation but punish defection. However, there is more to ZD strategies than just extortion, and recent work has uncovered some ZD strategies that promote cooperation in two-player games [10, 13] . Here we consider the full range of ZD strategies in a population setting and show that, when it comes to evolutionary success, it is generosity, not extortion, that rules.
We begin our analysis by considering populations restricted to the space of ZD strategies. We show that evolution within ZD always leads to a special subset of strategies, which we call generous ZD. Generous ZD strategies reward cooperation, but punish defection only mildly, and they tend to score lower payoffs than defecting opponents. Next, we build on recent work by Akin [13] , who identified generous strategies beyond those contained within ZD. We demonstrate that a large proportion of these generous strategies are robust to replacement in an evolving population. The robust, generous strategies can at worst be replaced neutrally. Conversely, we demonstrate that most generous strategies can readily replace resident non-generous strategies in a population. As a result, generous strategies are just as, or sometimes even more, successful than the most successful of well-known Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies in evolving populations. Finally, we show that populations evolving on the full set of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies spend a disproportionate amount of time near generous strategies, indicating that they are favored by evolution.
Methods and Results
In the Prisoner's Dilemma, two players X and Y must simultaneously choose whether to cooperate (c) or defect (d). If both players cooperate (cc) then they each receive payoff R. If X cooperates and Y defects (cd), then X loses out and receives the smallest possible payoff, S, while Y receives the largest possible payoff, T . If both players defect (dd), then both players receive payoff P . Payoffs are specified so that the reward for mutual defection is less than the reward for mutual cooperation, i.e. T > R > P > S. It is typically assumed that 2R > T + S, so that it is not possible for total payoff received by both players to exceed 2R. In what follows we will consider the payoffs T = B, R = B − C, P = 0 and S = −C, which comprise the so-called "donation game" [12] .
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) consists of infinitely many successive rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Press and Dyson [1] showed that it is sufficient to consider only the space of memory-1 strategies, i.e. strategies that specify the probability a player cooperates each round in terms of the payoff she received in the previous round. Memory-1 strategies consist of four probabilities, p = {p cc , p cd , p dc , p dd }. In particular, Press and Dyson [1] showed that the longterm payoff to a memory-1 player pitted against an arbitrary opponent is the same as her payoff would be against some other, memory-1 opponent. Thus, we limit our analysis to memory-1 players without loss of generality (see also Materials and Methods).
Evolutionary game theory
In the context of evolutionary game theory, we consider a population of N individuals each characterized by a strategy p. We say strategy p receives longterm payoff π(p, q) against an opponent with strategy q. The success of a strategy depends on its payoff when pitted against all individuals in the population [14] [15] [16] [17] . Traditionally, the evolutionary outcome in such a population has been understood in terms of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). A strategy p is an ESS if its longterm payoffs satisfy π(p, p) > π(p, q), or π(p, p) = π(p, q) and π(p, q) > π(q, q), for all opponents q = p.
The ESS condition provides a useful notion of stability in the context of an infinite population. However, in a finite population, the concept must be generalized to consider whether selection favors both invasion and replacement of a resident strategy by a mutant strategy [18, 19] . In a finite, homogenous population of size N , a newly introduced neutral mutation (i.e. a mutation that does not change the payoff to either player) will eventually replace the entire population with probability ρ = 1/N . A deleterious mutation, which is opposed by selection, will fix with probability ρ < 1/N ; while an advantageous mutation, which is favored by selection, will fix with probability ρ > 1/N . We say that a resident strategy p in a finite population of size N is evolutionary robust against a mutant strategy q if the probability of replacement satisfies ρ ≤ 1/N ; in other words, the robust strategy cannot be selectively replaced by the mutant strategy. In the limit of infinite population size, N → ∞, the condition ρ < 1/N reduces to the ESS condition.
When selection is weak (σ 1), we can write down an explicit criterion for robustness: a resident Y is evolutionary robust against a mutant X if and only if (see Materials and Methods and [18, 19] )
where we denote the longterm payoff of player X against player Y by s xy . We restrict our analysis to memory-1 players. In the two-player setting this restriction does not sacrifice generality, because, as per Press & Dyson [1] , the payoff received by a memory-1 strategy Y can be determined independently of her opponent's memory. However, in an evolutionary setting, Y 's success depends also on the payoff her opponent receives against himself. Nonetheless we will show that our results for generous strategies hold against all opponents, no matter how long their memories, provided the standard IPD assumption 2R > T + S holds.
Zero-determinant strategies, extortion, and generosity
Among the space of all memory-1 IPD strategies, Press and Dyson identified a subspace of so-called "zero-determinant" (ZD) strategies that ensure a fixed, linear relationship between two players' longterm payoffs. If player Y facing player X employs a ZD strategy of the form
then their payoffs will satisfy the linear relationship
The parameters χ and κ must lie in the range 0 ≤ κ ≤< B − C and max κ−B κ+C , κ+C κ−B ≤ χ ≤ 1 to produce a feasible strategy. Eq. 2 defines the full space of ZD strategies introduced by Press & Dyson [1] . Within this space, two particular subsets are of special interest: the extortion strategies, described by Press & Dyson, for which κ = P = 0 and χ > 0, and the generous strategies, described in our commentary [10] , for which κ = R = B − C and χ > 0.
Extortion strategies ensure that either the extortioner Y receives a higher payoff than her opponent X, s yx > s xy , or otherwise both players receive the payoff for mutual defection, s yx = s xy = 0. In contrast, generous strategies ensure that both players receive the payoff for mutual cooperation, s yx = s xy = B −C, or otherwise the generous player Y receives a lower payoff than her opponent, s yx < s xy .
Recent work has focused on the evolutionary prospects of extortioners [11, 12] , and found that such strategies are unsuccessful, except in very small populations. In fact, as we will show below, selection favors replacement of extortioners by generous strategies; whereas generous strategies are robust to replacement by extortioners. Moreover, the success of generous strategies persists when evolution proceeds within the full space IPD strategies.
Evolution of generosity within ZD strategies
We start by identifying the subset of ZD strategies that are evolutionary robust against all IPD strategies in a population of size N . Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 1 shows that a resident ZD strategy Y with κ y = B − C is robust against any mutant IPD strategy X if and only if χ y ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1) (see Materials and Methods). Conversely, provided N > 2, any resident ZD strategy Y with κ y < B − C can be selectively replaced by another strategy -namely, by a ZD strategy with κ x = B − C and χ x > (N + 1)/(2N − 1) (see Materials and Methods). Hence, those ZD strategies with κ = B − C and χ ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1) are precisely the ZD strategies that are evolutionary robust against all IPD strategies. We denote this set of robust ZD strategies as ZD R :
Here φ is left unconstrained, but it must lie in the range required to produce a feasible strategy, 0 < φ ≤ χB/(χC + B).
The robust ZD strategies are what we call cooperative, meaning they satisfy κ = B−C. Any cooperative player will agree to mutual cooperation when facing another cooperative player, and so they each receive payoff B − C. If a cooperative strategy further satisfies the condition χ > 0 then we say that the strategy is generous -meaning that any deviation from mutual cooperation causes the generous player's payoff to decline more than that of her opponent. The robust ZD strategies are all generous.
We now consider evolution in a population of N > 2 players restricted to the space of ZD strategies. Because selection favors replacement of any non-cooperative ZD strategy by some member of ZD R , we expect evolution within the space of ZD strategies to tend towards generous strategies -and thereafter to remain at generous strategies, because ZD R is robust. This expectation is confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations of well-mixed populations of IPD players (Fig. 1) . Following [12, 20] , we modeled evolution as a process in which individuals copy successful strategies with a probability that depends on their relative payoffs (see Materials and Methods). As Fig. 1 shows, evolution within the set of ZD strategies proceeds from extortion (κ = 0 and χ > 0) to generosity (κ = B − C and χ > 0). In fact, even populations initiated with χ < 0 evolve to generosity (Fig. S1 ). ≤ χ ≤ 1 with φ drawn uniformly within the feasible range given κ and χ. A proposed mutant strategy replaces the resident strategy with a fixation probability dependent on their respective payoffs, as in [12, 20] . The mean κ among 10 3 replicate populations is plotted as a function of time. Parameters are B = 3, C = 1, N = 100, and selection strength σ = 1.
Good strategies
The generous ZD strategies identified above are best understood by comparison with the space of good strategies recently introduced by Akin [13] . A good strategy stabilizes cooperative behavior in the twoplayer IPD: by defintion, if both players adopt good strategies then each receives payoff B − C and neither player can gain by unilaterally changing strategy. All good strategies are cooperative, i.e. they have κ = B − C. Moreover, the generous ZD strategies described above are precisely the intersection of good strategies [13] and ZD strategies [1] (Fig. 2) .
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The relationship between ZD and good strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The intersection between ZD and good is precisely the set of generous ZD strategies. Not all good strategies are generous. As a result, only a strict subset of good strategies are evolutionary robust, just as a strict subset of ZD strategies are evolutionary robust. Extortion strategies are neither generous nor evolutionary robust. Also shown are the locations of the classical IPD strategies [19] win-stay-lose-shift, tit-for-tat, and generous tit-for-tat.
We can identify the space of memory-1 good strategies as those of the form
where −1 ≤ χ ≤ 1 and −(χB + C) ≤ λ ≤ (B + χC) are required to produce a feasible strategy. Sufficient conditions for set G of good strategies are (see Supporting Information)
where the parameter φ is left unconstrained except that it must produce a feasible strategy. Numerics indicate these sufficient conditions are also neccesary (see Supporting Information). Note that the good strategies with λ = 0 correspond precisely to the generous ZD strategies. It is interesting to note that, in addition to tit-for-tat and generous tit-for-tat, which are ZD, the set of good strategies also contains win-lose-stay-shift, which is widely known as one of the most evolutionary successful IPD strategies [7] . Nonetheless, even though win-lose-stay-shift is good, it is not generous (it has χ = −C/B < 0, Fig. 3 ). Because it lacks generosity, win-lose-stay-shift can in fact be out-competed in evolving populations, as we shall see below. 
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The space of all cooperative IPD strategies, projected onto the parameters χ and λ. The boundary of the simplex delineates the set of feasible strategies with κ = B − C. Strategies colored light blue or dark blue are good ; whereas strategies colored dark blue are both good and evolutionary robust, under weak selection. Setting λ = 0 recovers the space of cooperative ZD strategies (red line). Note that all robust strategies are generous (i.e. χ > 0 and κ = B − C). Each point in the figure, {χ, λ}, has an associated range of φ values, and thus corresponds to multiple IPD strategies. However, the evolutionary robust good strategies resist replacement by any other strategy, regardless of the choice of φ. The figure illustrates the robust region for a large population size; whereas Eq. 3 gives the exact N -dependent conditions for robustness. Also shown are the locations of several classical IPD strategies. Tit-for-tat (χ = 1) and generous tit-for-tat (χ = 0) are limiting cases of generous ZD strategies, but they are not robust. Likewise, win-stay-lose-shift is good but not robust.
Evolutionary of generosity within good strategies
In this section we ask which good strategies are evolutionary robust; and we find that the robust good strategies are always generous -i.e. have χ > 0, regardless of λ. In the case of ZD, the conditions for evolutionary robustness do not depend on the parameter φ. Similarly, we will derive conditions for the robustness of good strategies that hold regardless of φ. Application of Eq. 1 allows us to derive the conditions for a good strategy to be evolutionary robust against all IPD strategies in a population of size N (see Supporting Information). The resulting set, G R , of evolutionary robust good strategies satisfies
Here φ is left unconstrained except that it must produce a feasible strategy. These analytical conditions for robustness are confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations (Fig. S2 ). Setting λ = 0 in the equation above recovers the conditions we previously derived for the robustness of ZD strategies. As in the case of ZD, the robust good strategies are exclusively limited to generous strategies (i.e. strategies with κ = B − C and χ > 0, see Fig. 3 ). Interestingly, the strategy win-stay-lose-shift does not lie within the region of robust good strategies (Fig. 3) . As a concrete demonstration of this result we have identified a specific strategy that selectively replaces win-lose-stay-shift in a finite population (see Supporting Information and Fig. S3 ). Furthermore, even under strong selection, and under increased mutation rates, win-stay-lose-shift can be dominated by some strategies (Fig. S3) .
The evolutionary success of generosity
We have shown that generous strategies are evolutionarily robust and eventually dominate in a population, when players are confined to the space of ZD strategies. We have also shown that amongst the good strategies, which stabilize cooperative behavior, the evolutionary robust strategies, G R , are also generous. To complement these results, we now systematically query the evolutionary success of generous strategies in general, by allowing a population to explore the full set of memory-1 strategies p = {p cc , p cd , p dc , p dd } and quantifying how much time the population spends near generosity.
Following [12, 21] , we performed simulations in the regime of weak mutation, so that the population is monomorphic for a single strategy at all times. Mutant strategies, drawn uniformly from the space {p cc , p cd , p dc , p dd }, are proposed at rate µ. A proposed mutant either immediately fixes or is immediately lost from the population, according to its fixation probability calculated relative to the current strategy in the population [12, 20] . Over the course of this simulation we quantified how much time the population spends in a δ-neighborhood of ZD, ZD R , G, and G R strategies, as well as extortion strategies (Fig. 4) . The δ-neighborhood of a strategy set is defined as those strategies within Euclidean distance δ of it, among the space of all memory-1 strategies. If the proportion of time spent in the δ-neighborhood is greater than would be expected by random chance (which is proportional to the volume of the δ-neighborhood), then evolution is said to favor that set of strategies.
It is already known that, except for very small populations, a population spends far less time near extortion strategies than expected by random chance, and that the same is true for the set of all ZD strategies [11, 12] . Thus, extortion and ZD strategies in general are disfavored by evolution in populations. This has led to the view the ZD strategies are of importance only in the setting of classical two-player game theory, and not in evolving populations [22] . However, in Fig. 4 we repeat this analysis but we additionally report the δ-neighborhoods of ZD R , G, and G R strategies. We find that, except in very small populations, selection strongly favors G, G R , and, especially, ZD R strategies. In particular, the population spends more than 100-times longer in the neighborhood of ZD R strategies than expected by random chance. Thus, ZD contains a subset of strategies that are remarkably successful in evolving populations.
We also analyzed the time spent near each individual good strategy, under both weak and strong selection. We found that the strategies most strongly favored by selection are virtually all generous (Fig. S4) . The remaining good strategies are typically moderately favored by selection, with the exception of those near win-stay-lose-shift, which are also strongly favored. : Generous strategies are favored by selection in evolving populations. We simulated a population under weak mutation, proposing mutant strategies drawn uniformly from the full set of memory-1 IPD strategies. We calculated the time spent in the δ-neighborhood [12] of ZD and extortion strategies, as well as robust ZD strategies, good strategies and robust good strategies, relative to their random (neutral) expectation. For small population sizes, extortioners are abundant and generous strategies are nearly absent. As population size increases, the frequency of generous strategies and good strategies is strongly amplified by selection; whereas extortion strategies, and ZD strategies in general, are disfavored, as previously reported [12] . Simulations were run until the population fixed 10 7 mutations. Parameters are B = 3, C = 1, δ = 0.05, and selection strength N σ = 100.
The success of generous strategies against classic IPD strategies
To complement the weak-mutation studies described above, we also compared the performance of generous ZD strategies against several classic IPD strategies, in a finite population of players [12, [18] [19] [20] , assuming either strong or weak mutation (i.e. high or low mutation rates). We performed Monte-Carlo simulations of populations constrained to different subsets of strategies, similar to those of [12] . In these simulations, a pair of individuals is chosen from the population at each time step, and the first individual copies the strategy of the second with a probability that depends on their respective payoffs, as above. Mutations also occur, with probability µ, so that the mutated individual randomly adopts another strategy from the set of strategies being considered. We ran simulations at a variety of populations sizes, ranging from from N = 2 to N = 1, 000. At very small population sizes, defector strategies tend to dominate (Fig. S5) , reflecting the fact that extortion pays in the classic two-player setting [1] . However, as the population size increases, good strategies, such as win-stay-lose-shift, and generous ZD quickly begin to dominate (Fig. S5) . Which strategy does best depends on the population size, the mutation rate, and the set of available strategies (Figs. S5-S6 ). In some regimes generous ZD strategies outperform even win-stay-lose-shift (Fig. S5) .
Discussion
We have shown that generous strategies tend to dominate in evolving populations of IPD players. This is a surprising result because, when faced with a defector strategy, generous strategies must by definition suffer a greater reduction in payoff than their opponent suffers. And so one might expect such strategies to be vulnerable to replacement by defector strategies -whereas in fact, we have shown, the reverse is true. Likewise, one might expect generous strategies to be unsuccessful at displacing resident strategies in a population. However, simulations reveal (Figs. S7-S8 ) that most generous strategies can selectively replace almost all other IPD strategies.
How can we account for the remarkable evolutionary success of generosity? First, it is important to note that the most successful generous strategies are not too generous. For example, in a large population, evolutionary robust ZD strategies must have χ > 1/2: that is, they must reduce their payoff when faced with a defector opponent, but not by too much. Second, whilst generous strategies score less than defector strategies in head-to-head matches, they are able to limit the difference between their own payoff and their opponent's payoff (see Materials and Methods). As a result, they tend to have a consistent probability ρ > 1/N of replacing a diversity of resident IPD strategies (Fig. S8) , allowing them to succeed in an evolutionary setting.
We found that generous ZD strategies are particularly successful when mutations arise at an appreciable rate. Under such circumstances, ZD R strategies can dominate even win-stay-lose-shift, a perennial favourite in evolving populations [7, 11, 23, 24] . Over all, selection strongly favors generous ZD strategies when evolution proceeds in the full space of memory-1 strategies. These results strongly contravene the view that ZD strategies are of little evolutionary importance [22] . In fact, we have shown that a subset of ZD strategies, the generous ones, are strongly favored in the evolutionary setting.
The discovery and elegant definition of ZD strategies remains a remarkable achievement, especially in light of decades worth of prior research on the Prisoner's Dilemma in both the two-player and evolutionary settings. ZD strategies comprise a variety of new ways to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Akin's generalization of cooperative ZD to good strategies provides novel insight into how cooperation between two rational players can be stabilized. However, in an evolutionary setting, amongst both ZD and good strategies, it is the generous ones that are most successful. with probability f x→y ,
where s x and s y denote the average IPD payoffs of players X and Y against the entire population, and σ denotes the strength of selection. When a mutant strategy X is introduced to a population otherwise consisting of a resident strategy Y , its probability of fixation, ρ is given by
Taylor expansion to first order about σ = 0 gives Eq. 1, the condition for selective replacement of Y by X under weak selection.
Evolutionary robustness of cooperative ZD strategies
Suppose that a resident strategy Y is cooperative and ZD. We will show that Y is evolutionary robust if and only if χ ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1). From Eq. 1 we deduce that Y is robust against any mutant IPD strategy X iff their payoffs satisfy
Using Eq. 2 to substitute for s yx yields the equivalent condition
Furthermore, we know that B − C ≥ s xy for any mutant X (because, otherwise Eq. 2 would imply that both s yx and s xy exceed B − C, which contradicts the assumption 2R > T + S). Therefore the cooperative ZD strategy Y is robust if and only if χ ≥ (N + 1)/(2N − 1).
Non-cooperative ZD strategies can be selectively replaced
Here we show that a resident ZD strategy Y with κ y < B − C is selectively replaced by a ZD strategy X with κ x = B − C and χ x > (N + 1)/(2N − 1). Since both players are ZD, their payoffs satisfy the equations
which result in the payoff matrix Substituting these payoffs into Eq. 1 shows that X can selectively 
as a sufficient condition for X to selectively replace Y . This sufficient condition is met by our assumption on X. And so non-cooperative ZD strategies can always be selectively replaced, provided N > 2.
Generous strategies limit the difference between their payoff and their opponent's payoff Increasing χ reduces the difference between two players' payoffs, regardless of the opponent's strategy. This is also true for generous good strategies, which satisfy
where v cd denotes the equilibrium rate of the play (cd) and v dc the equilibrium rate of the play (dc) [13] . The ability of generous strategies to limit the difference in payoffs with arbitrary opponents accounts for their remarkable consistency as invaders, as exemplified in Fig. S8 . On the other hand, a non-generous strategy, such as win-stay-lose-shift, is subject to larger differences between her payoff and her opponent's payoff, leading to less consistent success as an invader (Fig. S8 ).
Long-memory strategies
Our results for the evolutionary success of generous strategies in a finite population also hold against longer-memory opponents. As per Press & Dyson, from the perspective of a memory-1 player, a longmemory opponent is equivalent to a memory-1 opponent. Thus the payoff s xy can be determined by considering only the set of memory-1 strategies. However the payoff a long-memory opponent receives against itself, s xx , may depend on its memory capacity. Nonetheless, under the standard IPD assumption 2R > T + S the highest total payoff for any pair of players in the IPD is 2R; and so s xx ≤ R. This condition on s xx is the only condition required to derive our results on the robustness of ZD and good strategies (see Supporting Information), and so our results continue to hold even against long-memory invaders.
